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DISCRETIONARY TRADING ACCOUNTS AS
SECURITIES: HOWEY REVISITED
I. INTRODUCTION
The unprecedented popularity of commodities futures trading' in
the 1970's2 brought with it a new investment vehicle that proved to be
ripe for controversy under the federal securities laws. Investors in com-
modities futures began to use a trading medium known as a discretion-
ary trading account. Such an arrangement exists when an investor
deposits funds with a broker, entrusting him with total discretion to
make all investment decisions. Although aggrieved commodities fu-
tures investors are free to seek redress under the Commodity Exchange
Act of 1936, as amended by the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion Act of 1974,3 many injured investors, viewing those remedies as
inadequate, seek the protection of the Securities Act of 19334 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.5 In order to avail themselves of the
1. For an overview of commodities futures trading, see Note, The Role of the Commodiy
Futures Trading Commission Under the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 73
MICH. L. REv. 710, 711-15 (1975).
2. In 1960. 8.168 million futures contracts were traded, involving $54.7 billion. By 1973, the
commodity exchanges recorded 51.6 million futures transactions, valued at $520 billion. See
Hearings on S. No. 2485 Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture & Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
540, 543-46 (1974). In 1977, total trading volume was estimated at 42.09 million contracts, with a
value of $1.1 trillion. S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1. 13 (1978).
3. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) con-
tains a broad prohibition against cheating, defrauding, deceiving, or making false reports or state-
ments in connection with the sale of commodities for future delivery. Id. §§ 4b, 6b. The
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has regulatory authority over all commodi-
ties except onions, id. § 2. and is empowered to bring actions in federal court to enjoin violations
of the Act. Id. § 13a-l.
There are several provisions which serve to protect those engaged in discretionary agree--
ments. Commodity firms are required to provide supervision over all discretionary trades, 17
C.F.R. § 166.3 (1980), and written confirmation to clients of all trades. Id. § 1.33. Most impor-
tantly, commodity brokers are required to furnish investors with risk disclosure statements ex-
plaining the risk of loss inherent in futures trading. Id. § 1.55.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
5. Id. §§ 78a-78hh. Under the federal securities laws, an investor may recover the value of
his investment merely by showing that the broker failed to register the account as required by
section 5 of the Act, id § 77e. See, e.g., Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 99 (7th
Cir. 1977) (plaintiff claimed full reimbursement on the ground that his discretionary trading ac-
count was an Vnregistered security).
In addition, the history of private rights of action is well established under the securities laws,
whereas under the commodities laws it is a subject of some controversy. See generally Bromberg,
Commodities Law And Securities Law-Overlap and Presumptions, I J. CORP. L. 217, 288-96
(1976). For a general overview of the current status of implied private rights of action see Coin-
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protections offered in the federal securities laws, however, investors
must first prove that their transactions fall within the statutory defini-
tion of security.6
II. DEFINING THE ISSUE
Courts have repeatedly held that commodity futures contracts are
not securities7 and there is no question about the status of such con-
tracts. The important controversy concerns the standing of a discre-
tionary account as a security.
Congress intended to eliminate exploitation of the investing public
by fashioning a definition of security that would be broad enough to
include the many types of commercial instruments and investment
schemes that would come into existence and might fall within the ordi-
nary concept of a security.' Thus the focus of any inquiry should be on
whether the investment vehicle itself, a discretionary trading account,
ment, Confusing Signalsfrom the Burger Court: Judicial Refinement of Private Causes of Action, 16
TULSA L.J. 91 (1980).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1976).
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree-
ment, collateral-trust certificate, pre-organization certificate or subscription, transferable
share, investment contract, voting trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any inter-
est or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or par-
ticipation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Id.
Section 3(c)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976), pro-
vides a similar definition of security.
[Ainy note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation
in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, or in
general, any instrument commonly known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing ....
Id. The Supreme Court has held that the two definitions are "virtually identical." Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 342 (1967).
7. See, e.g., Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523, 525-26 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Commod.
Options Int'l, Inc., 553 F.2d 628, 632 (9th Cir. 1977); Milnarik v. M-S Commod. Inc., 457 F.2d
274, 275 n.I (7th Cir. 1972); Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., 353 F. Supp. 669, 671 (C.D. Cal. 1973);
Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359, 365-67 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
8. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1933). See also SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). The definition of security "embodies a flexible rather than a static
principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by
those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits." Id. For an expression of
the purposes of the Securities Act of 1933, see Senate Committee on Banking & Currency, S. REP.
No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
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fits the existing definition of a security under the federal laws.9 That a
particular discretionary trading account happens to involve commodi-
ties futures contracts should not be a factor in a court's decision on the
threshold definition issue.
The securities laws should not be construed to exclude discretion-
ary trading accounts in commodities futures solely because of the pro-
tections already available under the commodities laws.'" Nor should
the securities laws be broadened to include discretionary trading ac-
counts solely in response to a view that the commodities investor is not
sufficiently protected under the applicable laws. I The policy consider-
ations involved in determining whether a discretionary trading account
in commodities futures should be a security is a question best suited for
the legislature.' 2 The sole issue facing the courts should be limited to
whether a discretionary trading account, regardless of its underlying
subject, meets the existing test for identifying a security under the fed-
eral laws.' 3
III. THE CONTROVERSY
Attempts to invoke the federal securities laws center around that
part of the statutory definition of security which is termed "investment
contract."' 4 Although the term is found within the definition, the
courts have been responsible for giving it meaning.' 5 That task was
undertaken by the Supreme Court in the landmark case of SEC v. W. J
Howey Co6 The Court developed a three-prong test requiring an
9. See note 6 supra.
10. See note 3 supra.
1I. See note 5 supra.
12. For an overview of the policy considerations germane to this issue, see Bromberg, supra
note 5, at 225-26; Moreno, Discretionary Accounts, 32 MIAMI L. REv. 401, 411-14 (1977).
13. As stated in Forman v. Community Serv., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd,
500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), "the question before this Court is not whether the plaintiffs should
be protected; rather, the question is whether or not they are protected by the federal securities
laws." 366 F. Supp. at 1125.
14. See note 6 supra.
15. In adopting the term "investment contract" in § 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, Con-
gress was merely following the example of many state "blue sky" laws which had included the
term in an effort to fully protect the public in transactions which strayed from the traditional
forms of a security. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
16. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). The Supreme Court in Howey relied on the Minnesota case of State
v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920), a case involving the sale of
securities without a license in violation of the Minnesota Blue Sky Law. 1919 Minn. Laws, ch. 105
(current version at MINN. STAT. §§ 80A.01-.31 (1979 & Supp. 1981)). The court summarized that
act as follows:
All persons, firms, and corporations are prohibited from engaging, within this state,
in the business of selling or negotiating for the sale of any stocks, bonds, investment cqn-
3
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investment of money, a common enterprise, and an expectation of prof-
its to come solely from the efforts of others 7 before an investment con-
tract could be found to exist. That the Howey test is still recognized as
the definitive approach to analyzing investment contracts is evidenced
by the two recent Supreme Court decisions addressing that issue, Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel18 and United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman 9
In the typical discretionary arrangement, whereby an investor de-
posits funds with a broker and authorizes the broker to exercise full
discretion over the investment decisions, the first and third elements of
the Howey test are easily met. By its very nature, such a discretionary
agreement involves an investor placing funds in the hands of the broker
on whom he relies to achieve a profit.20  Satisfaction of the common
enterprise element, however, has been open to considerable dispute
among the lower courts, since the Howey opinion failed to supply
guidelines for identifying the existence of a common enterprise.
tracts, or others securities issued by him or it, except securities specifically enumerated in
section 2 of the act. No investment company or dealer shall sell or offer for sale, or
profess the business of selling or offering for sale, securities coming within the scope of
the act, unless and until he or it shall have furnished to the state securities commission
information touching the honesty, good faith, and character of the business of the com-
pany or dealer, and shall have obtained from the commission a license to sell securities.
Violation of any of the provisions of the act is made a gross misdemeanor.
146 Minn. at 56, 177 N.W. at 938 (emphasis added).
Gopher Tire was the first case to consider the term "investment contract," defining it as "[t]he
placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its
employment." Id.
17. 328 U.S. at 301. "[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is
led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party .... " Id.
18. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
19. 421 U.S. 837 (1975). Both Forman and Daniel used the three-prong Howey test to deter-
mine whether shares of common stock in a cooperative housing corporation and a compulsory,
non-contributory pension plan, respectively, are investment contract securities. A long line of
cases preceding Forman and Daniel evidence the fact that the Howey test is used by the majority
of courts faced with such an issue. See, e.g., Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96 (7th
Cir. 1977); Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Continental Commod. Corp.,
497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); Milnarik v. M-S Commod., Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972); Conti-
nental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967).
Some state courts have replaced Howey with a new test. Under the risk capital theory, the
definition turns on who bears the risk of loss and who manages the business. See, e.g., Silver Hills
Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 361 P.2d 906 (1961); State v. Hawaii
Mkt. Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971). Under such an approach, a discretionary
trading account would almost certainly be a security. The investor bears the risk of loss and the
broker controls the business. Although the risk-capital theory has been used since 1961, federal
courts have continued to follow Howey. Furthermore, the Supreme Court failed to acknowledge
the risk-capital theory in its recent determination of the investment contract issue in Forman and
Daniel.
20. See, e.g., Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 460 (9th Cir. 1978).
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Some courts have adopted a restrictive approach to the common
enterprise element. Known as horizontal commonality, this approach
focuses on the relationship among the investors and requires a pooling
of funds among investors before the requisite commonality can be
met.2 The leading proponent of the horizontal approach to common-
ality is the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. That court first ad-
dressed the issue in 1972 in Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc.,22
holding that the discretionary commodities trading account lacked the
commonality required by the Howey investment contract test.
The court found that even though the broker entered into similar
discretionary arrangements with customers other than the plaintiff, the
success or failure of those other accounts had no direct impact on the
profitability of the plaintifi's account. On that basis the court held that
the various customers were not joint participants in a common invest-
ment enterprise.23 The author of the opinion, Judge Stevens, now sit-
ting on the Supreme Court bench, went on to describe the relationship
between investor and broker as that of an agency for hire.
No matter how many different persons [defendant] became an
agent for under similar or even identical discretionary ac-
counts, his relationship with each would remain as that of
agent and principal. Each contract creating this relationship
is unitary in nature and each will be a success or failure with-
out regard to the others.24
Five years later the Seventh Circuit was again confronted with a
discretionary trading account. In Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc.21
the court reaffirmed its narrow interpretation of the common enterprise
element. In holding that the discretionary trading account at issue was
not a security, the court focused on the lack of ties among the investors.
Relying on Milnarik, the opinion stressed the necessity of a pooling of
funds.26 The court further strengthened its conviction by stating that
constructively similar treatment of individual accounts is not sufficient
21. See, e.g., Curran v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir.
1980); Commercial Iron & Metal Co. v. Bache & Co., 478 F.2d 39 (10th Cir. 1973); Wasnowic v.
Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972), aj'dmem., 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973).
22. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
23. 457 F.2d at 277.
24. Id. at 278.
25. 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977).
26. Id. at 101. "It is apparent then that this Court's decision in Mi/narik was based on the
assumption that a sharing or pooling of funds is required by Howey, and we are unwilling to
overrule that determination." Id.
[Vol. 16:334
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to meet the pooling requirement of the common enterprise elementY.2
The Third Circuit adopted the reasoning and conclusion of the
Seventh Circuit in a case substantially similar to Hirk and Minarik. In
Wasnowic v. Chicago Board of Trade,28 the court relied on the absence
of a pooling of funds among investors and a pro-rata distribution of
profits to find that the discretionary trading account failed the com-
monality test of an investment contract security.29
B. Vertical Commonality
Not all courts have viewed the common enterprise element in such
a restrictive light. The earliest cases involving a discretionary trading
account in commodity futures held that pooling of investors' funds is
not a necessary element of an investment security." These decisions
led to a more flexible interpretation of the common enterprise require-
ment, the theory of vertical commonality. This approach focuses on
the relationship between investor and promoter ignoring the absence of
multiple investors, pooling of resources, and sharing of profits.
The line of cases adopting this view of commonality3 rely on a
Ninth Circuit definition of common enterprise. In SEC v. Glenn W.
Turner Enterprises, Inc.,32 a common enterprise is defined as "one in
which the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent
27. Id. The court stated that treating the accounts "as if commingled" was not the same as
an actual pooling of investors' funds.
28. 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa 1972), aj'dmem., 491 F.2d 752 (3d Cir. 1973).
29. 352 F. Supp. at 1069.
As in Milnarik, nothing in the instant complaint suggests the type of common enterprise
or pooling of funds for a common purpose required to convert the discretionary account
... into a statutory security .... Although, as in Milnarik, it is alleged that [the bro-
ker] had opened similar accounts with numerous customers, no claim is made that a joint
enterprise existed comprised of a group of investors holding discretionary accounts with
him. Indeed, the opposite appears to be the case. At various parts in the complaint,
plaintiffs allege that [the broker] violated his duty to segregate and separately account for
the funds in plaintiffs' account from other discretionary accounts. . . .Thus, it is clear
that plaintiffs did not enter into discretionary trading agreements with [the broker] with
the understanding that their customers would share ratably in the profits. Without the
presence of this element of the Howey test, plaintiffs' individual discretionary trading
account with [the broker] cannot be considered as a security within the meaning of the
Securities laws.
Id.
30. See, e.g., Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Maheu v.
Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Anderson v. du Pont & Co., 281 F.
Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968) (arrangements similar to discretionary accounts involving trading on
the commodities market found to be investment contract securities).
31. See, e.g., SEC v. Continental Commod. Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); Jones v. Int'l Inventors, Inc., 429 F.
Supp. 119 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
32. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 82 (1973).
6
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upon the efforts and success of those seeking the investment of third
parties. 33 This definition is found in a footnote to the court's opinion,
accompanied by no further elaboration. The court in Turner was
presented not with a discretionary trading account in commodities fu-
tures, but with a pyramid selling scheme in which each participant
makes money by recruiting new investors to enter the program.3 4 The
court's emphasis in Turner was not on the common enterprise element
of the Howey test. The essence of Turner was its treatment of the third
element of Howey and its holding regarding that issue.
Nevertheless, the definition was adopted by later courts35 and used
as support for the proposition that investor dependence on the expertise
of the promoter is the critical factor in determining the existence of a
common enterprise.36 Under the vertical approach to commonality, the
Howey investment contract test can be satisfied without pooling or
profit sharing, as long as the investor's reliance upon the efforts of the
promoter is of critical importance to the success of the venture.37
One commentator recognized that under this view, the common
enterprise element of the Howey test appears to merge with the reliance
element of the test, thus creating, by a de facto elimination of one of the
elements, a two-prong Howey test.38 This seeming infidelity to Holvey
troubles at least one commentator who sees the next step in the erosion
of the Howey test as diminishing the degree of dependence required
under the third element.39 Another problem with this approach is that
such an interpretation presupposes the idea that the common enterprise
element of the test is mere surplusage and need not be treated as a
33. Id. at 482 n.7.
34. See generally Note, Pyramid Schemes.- Dare to be Regulated, 61 GEo. L.J. 1257 (1973).
35. See, e.g., Hector v. Weins, 533 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Continental Commod.
Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert,
denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974).
36. 497 F.2d at 522. "[T]he critical inquiry is confined to whether the fortuity of the invest-
ments collectively is essentially dependent upon promoter expertise." Id.
37. See, e.g., Marshall v. Lamson Bros., 368 F. Supp. 486 (S.D. Iowa 1974) (a single investor
and broker can satisfy the common enterprise element).
38. Bonnett, How Common Is a "Common Enterprise'?, 1974 ARIz. ST. L. J. 339, 365-66.
Bonnett approves of such a merging:
[lit seems sufficient to recommend that courts confronted with common enterprise argu-
ments should avoid a dogmatic four-part checklist approach to the necessary factual
analysis. If the other parts of the Howey test are present, the lack of a "common enter-
prise" should rarely defeat the finding of an investment contract.
Id. at 366. Bonnett characterizes Howey as a four-part test: (I) investment of money (2) in a
common enterprise (3) with the expectation of profits (4) solely from the efforts of the promoter or
a third party. Id. at 341.
39. Bromberg, supra note 5, at 255.
[Vol. 16:334
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distinct element. It can be argued that the Supreme Court would not
have fashioned a three-prong test if it intended to require satisfaction
of only two of the elements.
IV. RETURN TO HOWEY
Not only did the Supreme Court fail to offer a definition of com-
mon enterprise in Howey, it also declined to state exactly what relation-
ship in the Howey case comprised the common enterprise element of its
newly enunciated test. It is unclear what relationship the Court looked
to in finding the requisite commonality: that of the individual inves-
tors, that of each investor with the promoter, or that of the investors as
a whole with the promoter. Commentators turn to the facts of Howey
for an insight on the answer to that question."a
In Howey, prospective investors were offered the opportunity to
purchase units of a citrus grove development owned by the W. J.
Howey Company. These potential investors were primarily tourists
and vacationers who were not engaged in the citrus business, but rather
were induced to invest their money upon the expectation of substantial
profits. In addition to the land sales contract, each individual was of-
fered a service contract with Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc. The
service contract gave Howey-in-the-Hills a leasehold interest in the
property, along with full discretion and authority over the cultivation,
harvesting, and marketing of the citrus crops in return for a specified
fee plus the cost of labor and materials used in servicing that pur-
chaser's acreage.4' Investors were advised that ownership of a tract
would not be profitable without accompanying arrangements for serv-
ice of the grove, although purchasers were free to engage service cor-
porations other than Howey-in-the-Hills.42
The District Court43 and the Court of Appeals, denied plaintiffs
protection under the federal securities laws, interpreting the case as in-
volving separate transactions consisting of no more than a sale of real
estate and an agreement by the seller to manage the property for the
buyer.45 The Supreme Court disagreed, emphasizing the fact that the
40. See, e.g., Bonnett, supra note 38, at 346-362; 43 Mo. L. Rav. 779, 781-85 (1978).
41. 328 U.S. at 296.
42. 85% of the acreage sold during the three-year period ending May 31, 1943 was covered by
service contracts with Howey-in-the-Hills. Id. at 295.
43. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 60 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Fla. 1945).
44. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 151 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1945).
45. The district judge "correctly concluded that the facts so strongly relied on by the plaintiff
... could not convert what was in law and in fact the purchase in fee simple of a designated and
1980]
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individual tracts were not separately fenced or otherwise significantly
distinguished. It further emphasized that individual development of
the land would seldom be economically feasible.46
In deciding that the sales and service contracts taken together are
an investment contract security, the Court concentrated on what the
defendant was actually offering: an opportunity to contribute money
and to share in the profits of a large citrus fruit operation without indi-
vidual management and development efforts.47 The opinion referred
only once to a common enterprise. "A common enterprise managed by
respondents or third parties with adequate personnel and equipment is
therefore essential if the investors are to achieve their paramount aim
of a return on their investments. 48
Yet what is the "common enterprise" to which the Court alludes?
Emphasis was definitely given to the relationship between the investors
and the promoter of the venture. The individuals provided the capital
and the promoter provided the management, control and operation of
the enterprise. It would appear that neither the investor nor the pro-
moter could prosper without the other, thus giving credence to the Tur-
ner definition.49
The Court also alluded to the success of the plan being dependent
upon its exercise as a full scale operation. Profits are substantial be-
cause a large amount of capital, derived from several investors, is avail-
able to pay for uniform services to be rendered to uniform units
together comprising a large citrus grove development.50 One commen-
tator viewed "the overall undertaking," the business of growing and
selling citrus fruit, as the enterprise to which the Court referred.51 Such
an analysis would support the conclusion that a common enterprise re-
fers to the relationship between a group of investors who have com-
bined capital in order to support a large business undertaking and the
promoter. In that light, a mere showing of reliance between a single
investor and broker would hardly be in keeping with the enterprise
found in Howey.
described grove, and the making of a separate contract for servicing it, into the purchase of a
security. ... Id. at 717.
46. 328 U.S. at 300. "Such tracts gain utility as citrus groves only when cultivated and devel-
oped as component parts of a larger area." Id.
47. Id. at 299.
48. Id. at 300.
49. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
50. See note 46 supra.
51. Bonnett, supra note 38, at 348.
[Vol. 16:334
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In recognition of the fact that Howey provides us with little more
than the notion that the basis of the investment contract must be a spec-
ulative profit-seeking business venture, commentators have turned to
the authorities 52 cited in Howey as a source of information on what
factors are necessary to find a common enterprise.53 They conclude
that in none of those cases was a pooling of funds or profit-sharing
arrangement a significant factor in determining the existence of an in-
vestment contract. 54  Their theory, then, is that since the Supreme
Court relied on those cases in deciding Howey and formulating its in-
vestment contract test, the Court could not have intended that its defi-
nition be dependent upon such restrictive factors.5 1
It is conceded that the Howey Court intended its definition of in-
vestment contract to be flexible. The Court stressed that its test "em-
bodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of
adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those
who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits. 56
Given the language, it seems unlikely that the Court intended that the
existence of an investment contract be determined by the number of
investors, which is substantially what the theory of horizontal common-
ality57 reduces to.
In Howey, the Court was not fooled by the fact that each investor
52. See notes 53-54 infra.
53. See Bonnett, supra note 38, at 351-52; Note, Discretionary Commodity Accounts as "Se-
curities Applying the Howey Investment Contract Test to a New Investment Medium, 67 GEO. L.
J. 269, 282-90 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Discretionary Accounts]. Both commentators conduct
their discussion according to a breakdown of the state and federal authorities relied on in Howey.
54. The underpinnings of the Supreme Court's definition of investment contract indicate
that the Court did not intend to require a pooling of investors' funds by using the phrase
"common enterprise." The state cases cited by the Court in Howey support a broader
reading of the term. . . .Finally, several of the federal cases relied on by the Supreme
Court found investment contracts in schemes without a pooling of investors' funds.
Discretionary Accounts, supra note 53, at 290. See, e.g., State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146
Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920). Although the facts show that investors' funds were pooled and
profits paid out pro rata, the court's holding contained no reference to those facts as germane to its
finding an investment contract. The Supreme Court also relied on Prohaska v. Hemmer-Miller
Dev. Co., 256 I1l. App. 331 (1930), in which a single contract for one tract of land was at issue.
Even in the apparent absence of multiple investors, the court found an investment contract to
exist. Accord, People v. White, 124 Cal. App. 548, 12 P.2d 1078 (1932). But the Howey court also
relied on Penfield Co. v. SEC, 143 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1944), in which the Court of Appeals sup-
ported its holding that an investment contract existed with an emphasis on pooling and profit-
sharing. But see SEC v. Payne, 35 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), in which the District Court's
holding seemed to indicate an investment contract could be based on either vertical or horizontal
commonality.
55. E.g., Bonnett, supra note 38, at 356-62.
56. 328 U.S. at 299. "[T]he statutory policy of affording broad protection to investors is not
to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formulae." Id. at 301.
57. See text accompanying notes 21-29 supra.
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purchased an individual tract of land and was given an individual land
sales contract and warranty deed. The Court looked to the "substance"
of the enterprise and based its decision on the economic reality of the
situation.58 According to the Court, the fortunes of the investors and
the promoter-manager were interwoven so that neither would achieve
profits without the contribution of the other. Thus a lack of horizontal
commonality in the case of a single investor should not be used to de-
feat the finding of an investment contract if the other elements are pres-
ent. Yet that determination is not sufficient to conclude that a
discretionary trading account possesses the requisite commonality.
There is still the matter of whether vertical commonality is found in
discretionary trading accounts and, if so, whether such a finding brings
those transactions within the realm of the securities laws.
A recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case considered that very
issue and answered it in the negative. In Brodt v. Bache & Co .,9 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on its own definition of common
enterprise6" to find that under vertical commonality no common enter-
prise existed between the investor and the broker.6" The court empha-
sized the fact that there was no direct correlation between the success or
failure of the broker and the brokerage firm and the profit or loss of the
individual investor.6" The court concluded that "[mlerely furnishing
investment counsel to another for a commission, even when done by
way of a discretionary commodities account, does not amount to a
common enterprise. "63
V. CONCLUSION
Howey clearly stood for the proposition that in order to be an
58. Just as the Supreme Court stated in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967), in search-
ing for the meaning and scope of the word security, form should be disregarded for substance and
the emphasis should be on the economic reality of the situation. Id. at 336.
59. 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978).
60. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
61. Our definition rejects any requirement of horizontal commonality in favor of requir-
ing only vertical commonality. . . .The concept of vertical commonality requires that
the investor and the promoter be involved in some common venture without mandating
that other investors also be involved in that venture. . . .Our case comes to this. Using
the classic definition of Howey, there existed an "investment" by the appellant, the prof-
its from which were "to come solely from the efforts of others." The investment, how-
ever, was not in a "common enterprise." It was in commodities futures. Appellant's
enterprise was a "solitary" one.
595 F.2d at 461-62.
62. Id. at 461.
63. Id. at 462.
[Vol. 16:334
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investment contract, there must be a relationship between investor and
promoter whereby the two share a common interest in the underlying
scheme in addition to the investor's reliance upon the expertise of the
promoter. In the typical discretionary arrangement, the investor and
broker share no common bond other than that of a customer's belief
that the company he has chosen will perform its services well. The
broker normally receives a flat commission regardless of the success or
failure of the individual's account.'
It was the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that promulgated the
definition of common enterprise requiring that the fortunes of the in-
vestor and the promoter be interwoven. 65 The same court recently uti-
lized that analysis in Brodt v. Bache & Co.66 to find that no such
relationship existed between an investor and a broker under a discre-
tionary trading account arrangement, and thus that an investment con-
tract did not exist. 67 A discretionary trading account fails the existing
test for an investment contract security because it lacks the necessary
element of a common enterprise. Therefore, aggrieved investors using
such an account as an investment vehicle should be unable to invoke
the federal securities laws through the investment contract provision.68
64. In fact, exchange rules prohibit brokers from sharing in the profits or losses of their cus-
tomers. See Moreno, supra note 12, at 404 n.17.
65. See notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text.
66. 595 F.2d 459 (1978).
67. Note that a discretionary trading account may be a security if the investor and broker
agree to enter into a profit-sharing agreement whereby the broker is compensated by a share of the
profits. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1976), and Section 3(a)(10)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976), include such an arrange-
ment in their respective definitions of security as "an interest in any profit-sharing agreement."
See, e.g., SEC v. Wickham, 12 F. Supp. 245 (D. Minn. 1935) (profits to be shared 60-40 between
broker and investor). See also Moreno, supra note 12, at 403-04.
68. The narrowness of this conclusion should be noted. The fact that injured speculators in
discretionary accounts are unable to receive federal statutory protection under the investment
contract provision of the securities laws in no way leaves them without a route to remedy. Com-
modities investors, the class most likely to use discretionary trading accounts, still enjoy federal
protection under the federal commodities laws. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976).
Investors can always look to state blue sky laws, although they may find themselves faced
with similar issues. Thirty-four jurisdictions have now adopted the Uniform Securities Act in a
substantially similar form. ALA. CODE §§ 8-6-1 to -33 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.55.010-.270
(1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1235 to -1263 (1959); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-51-101 to -129
(1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-470 to -502 (West 1977); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. §§ 2-2401 to
-2418 (West 1964); HAWAni REV. STAT. §§ 485-1 to -25 (1957); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1401 to -1462
(1980); IND. CODE §§ 23-2-1-1 to -24 (1976); IOWA CODE §§ 502.101-.614 (1975); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 17-1252 to -1275 (1975); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 292.310-.550, .991 (1970); MD. CORP. &
ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 to -805 (1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1 10A, §§ 101-417 (West
1972); Micii. COMp. LAWS §§ 451.501-.818 (1970); MINN. STAT. §§ 80A.01-.31 (1979 & Supp.
1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 409.101-.418 (Vernon 1968); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 15-2001 to -
2025 (1961); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 8-1101 to -1124 (Supp. 1965); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 90.010-.210
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The conclusion reached above is not to stand for the proposition
(a) that Congress cannot revise the definition of security to include dis-
cretionary trading accounts; or (b) that the Supreme Court cannot re-
vise the Howey investment contract test by eliminating the common
enterprise element; or (c) that the Supreme Court or Congress cannot
offer a definition of common enterprise. Any of the above would serve
to eliminate the confusion and hopefully end the existing controversy.
Resolution of this issue is inevitable, as the amount of futures trading
continues to increase with discretionary trading accounts as the promi-
nent investment vehicle.
Katie Colopy Gibson
(1963); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 49:3-47 to -76 (Supp, 1980); N.M. COMP. STAT. §§ 58-13-1 to -47
(1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78A-1 to -65 (1975); OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, §§ 101-504 (1971); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 59.005-.995 (1975); 70 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1-101 to -704 (1980); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit 10
§§ 851-895 (1963); S.C. CODE §§ 35-1-10 to -1590 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-1-i to -30
(Supp. 1980); VA. CODE §§ 13.1-501 to -527.3 (1956); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 21.20.005-.940 (1974);
W. VA. CODE §§ 32-1-101 to -4-418 (1974); Wis. STAT. §§ 551.01-.69 (1979); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-4-
101 to -129 (1977).
The definition of security in the Uniform Securities Act is based on that offered in the federal
securities acts. Thus an investor would have to get past the initial hurdle of defining a discretion-
ary account as a security under state law as well.
The fact that attempts to invoke protection under both state and federal securities laws have
centered on the investment contract phrase does not preclude an investor from focusing on an-
other part of the definition, such as "profit-sharing agreement." See note 67 supra.
Also available to the aggrieved investor are the common law actions based on fraud, misrep-
resentation, and breach of contract. The main disadvantage of such an approach is the lack of
uniformity among the fifty states. Although recovery in such actions is not as certain as under
statutory law, the potential damages are equally as great.
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